Allowing CEOs to hedge the risk in the compensation contracts their …rms give them has been controversial because such hedging permits the executives to undo some of the incentive e¤ects of those contracts; it also results in a divergence between the compensation …rms pay their senior executives and the compensation those executives e¤ectively receive. We analyze the personal hedging activities of CEOs and identify when …rms may gain or lose by allowing or prohibiting such hedging. We also describe variations in CEOs'demands for various compensation hedges, and how …rms will restructure their CEOs'compensation contracts in anticipation the CEOs will engage in such hedging.
Introduction
Hedging some of their compensation risk by engaging in transactions with investment banks has become increasingly popular among CEOs. Bloomberg Business Week, in an article titled "Some CEOs Are Selling Their Companies Short, With a Little Help from Their Bankers...," 1 stated that in 2009, 107 companies reported to the SEC that their executives had hedged compensation risk, up from 48 in 2007. This article also asserted that "Investment banks . . . rushed to provide hedge services" to senior managers of …rms, and it quotes an attorney as saying "I don't know of a bank that doesn't have a department doing this." 2 Related, Dash [2011] reported that more than a quarter of the partners at Goldman Sachs hedged their compensation risk over the years 2007 to 2010.
At the same time it has become increasingly popular, compensation hedging also has become increasingly controversial. Opposition to such hedging has extended all the way to the U.S. Senate:
U.S. senators Menendez, Merkley, and Lautenberg, in a letter to the FDIC, opined:
"We strongly believe that hedging strategies used by highly-paid executives on their own incentive-based compensation should be prohibited. Quite simply, the use of hedging takes the "incentive" out of incentive-based compensation."
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One of the conditions of federal aid for those …nancial institutions that received aid during the recent …nancial crisis was that the …nancial institutions prohibit their executives from engaging in such hedging. 4 Also, many well known public companies explicitly prohibit such hedging: e.g., both
Procter and Gamble and Kellogg impose such prohibitions.
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In this article, we try to account for both the popularity of and controversy surrounding CEO compensation hedging by developing a model that explains why some companies bene…t from allowing compensation hedging, while other companies do not. While we show that there are several economic considerations at work simultaneously that in ‡uence how compensation hedging a¤ects …rm value, we believe there is one fundamental factor, namely how compensation hedging allows managers to transform their compensation contracts into e¤ectively di¤erent contracts, that is responsible both for the 1 February 25, 2010 issue, Jane Sasseen byline. 2 Bettis, Bizjack and Kalpathy [2010] document extensive personal hedging by …rms'senior managers. 3 The letter can be found at: http://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-12-11/s71211-4.pdf 4 For example, Crimson Exploration corporate policy states: "You [CEO] may not engage in certain hedging transactions with respect to Company securities.
Certain forms of hedging transactions, such as zerocost collars and forward sale contracts, allow a stockholder to lock in the value of his or her stock holdings, often in exchange for all or a portion of any future appreciation in the stock. The stockholder is then no longer exposed to the full risks of stock ownership and may no longer have the same objectives as the Company's other stockholders. Therefore, such hedging transactions are prohibited under this policy." From: http://crimsonexploration.com/default/Insider_Trading_Policy_Preclearance_3_1_2010.pdf 5 http://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-12-11/s71211-4.pdf popularity of, and opposition to, CEO compensation hedging. In short, we contend that opposition to such hedging derives principally from …rms losing some control over their CEOs'incentives when they allow the CEOs to transform their compensation contracts via hedging, whereas the popularity of such hedging derives principally from the potential such hedging has to improve the …rm-CEO relationship by reducing the variance in CEOs'compensation.
Expanding on these two points, allowing CEOs to transform their original compensation contracts through hedges can expand the agency problem …rms face with their CEOs from the usual (and extensively studied) "operating action" agency problem …rms always face with their CEOs to include an agency problem with respect to the CEOs'contract transformation choices. Further, since CEOs' operating action choices are determined by maximizing their expected utility under the transformed contracts, and not under the original contracts, the "operating action" agency problem …rms face potentially can be exacerbated because of the CEOs' opportunities to transform their original contracts. But, if …rms anticipate the contract transformation choices their CEOs make when they are allowed to hedge, these extra agency problems sometimes can be more than o¤set to the extent that investment banks (IBs) can construct compensation variance-reducing hedging instruments that the …rms and their CEOs could not construct on their own. Exactly when and how such improvements are possible is the main focus of this article.
Being aware that CEOs can and do transform their compensation contracts by hedging has implications not only for …rms' market values, but also for the proper interpretation of virtually any CEO compensation data, hypothesis, or claim, because it forces one to distinguish between the pay packages …rms give their executives and the (net) pay packages the executives actually receive. In particular, this distinction between pay packages given and pay packages received forces one to recognize that stated pay-for-performance sensitivities (PFPS) of executives'compensation contracts can exceed their e¤ ective PFPS once CEOs' hedging is taken into account. We show that an unwary outsider (researcher, journalist, etc.,) can be further misled in their perceptions of a …rm's CEO's contract's e¤ective PFPS when the …rm employing the CEO correctly anticipates the CEO's propensity to hedge his compensation risk, because such a …rm will "boost" its CEO's contract's stated PFPS in anticipation that the CEO's subsequent hedging will "knock down" the contract's e¤ective PFPS through his transactions with IBs.
We also study how a CEO's demand for hedges varies with the hedging instrument. We consider two distinct types of hedges, a "…xed-for-variable" swap ("swap") in which a CEO receives a …xed payment from an IB in return for giving the IB a fraction of the variable portion of the CEO's compensation, and what we call a "performance hedge" (PH), a …nancial instrument whose cash ‡ows have nonzero covariance with the performance measure(s) underlying the variable portion of the CEO's compensation. We produce an array of comparative statics related to CEOs'demand curves for these two hedging instruments and …rms'optimal contract design in anticipation of such CEOs' demand for hedging instruments.
While there is a vast literature studying the incentives …rms have to hedge at the corporate level (e.g., Stein, 1993 and , our article is not closely connected to that literature, since we are concerned with the e¤ects of hedging on the design of CEO compensation contracts and, hence, are interested in the incentives of managers to hedge at the personal level. Much of the analytical literature on hedging in economics and …nance has emphasized …nancial investment issues rather than the contracting and PFPS issues that are central to this article. 6 Allowing CEOs to hedge some of the risk in their compensation contracts by hedging through investment banks has some similarities to allowing executives to unwind the equity stakes in their …rms. Just as we observe that allowing compensation hedging can dampen the incentive e¤ects of CEO's contracts with their …rms, Bar-Gill and Bebchuk (2003) and Bebchuk and Fried (2004) (among others) have observed that allowing equity unwinding can have negative incentive e¤ects. We note however that, at least over short horizons, compensation hedging may be allowed while unwinding equity stakes is prohibited, since …rms typically have vesting provisions for their equity grants that speci…cally prohibit their
CEOs from selling the shares granted to them during the vesting period at the same time they may not forbid their CEOs from transacting with IBs. Laux (2010) has demonstrated that granting a CEO this opportunity can be optimal because it makes the CEOs' ex post incentives for project abandonment align more closely with the …rm's shareholders's incentives. In contrast, in our model, the bene…t of compensation hedging comes through the improved risk-sharing a¤orded by transacting with IBs. Since, as we show, the amount and kind of hedging a CEO does is a¤ected by his original contract's PFPS, this article is also related to Baker, Gibbons, and Murphy [1994] who showed that, when subjective performance measures are available, it may be necessary to adjust the PFPS placed on objective performance measures to prevent the objective measures from "crowding out" the use of subjective measures. None of the extant literature we are familiar with has studied how a manager's ability to recon…gure the contract his …rm o¤ers him by engaging in transactions with IBs to hedge his compensation risk a¤ects either the general design of the manager's contract or the manager's …rm 's value. 7 This article is part of the large literature on induced moral hazard and multi-task agency problems, as studied by, among others, Holmstrom and Ricarti-Costa [1986] , Holmstrom and Milgrom [1991] , Feltham and Xie [1994] , Datar, Kulp and Lambert [2001] , and Demski and Sappington [1987] , since when a CEO transforms his original contract into a revised contract by transacting with IBs, his ultimate goal is to a¤ect both what personally costly e¤ort choice he eventually adopts and what consumption he eventually receives. The article is also related to the literatures on relative performance evaluation (see, e.g., Lazear and Rosen [1981] , Antle and Smith [1986] ) and earnings management (see, e.g., Dye [1988] , Demski [1998] , Arya, Glover, and Sunder [1998] ). Relative performance evaluation (RPE) entails having a CEO's compensation tied to an index of the performance of other …rms in the same industry in which the CEO's …rm operates or having his …rm's performance judged against some market index. This is another implicit means of hedging the CEO's compensation risk because it factors out noise in the performance measure common to …rms in an industry or common to …rms exposed to the same market factors. Also, the ability of a CEO to transform his contract into e¤ectively a di¤erent contract is related to the ability of a CEO to engage in earnings management or, more generally, to alter the distribution of the measure used to judge the CEO's performance. In both cases, when CEOs engage in the activity, the compensation they receive is altered from the original intentions of the …rm that employs the CEO.
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We conclude this section by outlining how the article proceeds and also by summarizing the article's principal results section by section. In Section 2, we introduce our base model, which posits that the …rm and its CEO have common information concerning the e¤ectiveness of the hedging instruments o¤ered by the IB in reducing the compensation risk the CEO is subject to. Section 3 contains some preliminary results designed to develop the reader's intuition about the e¤ects of an IB o¤ering to sell a …rm's CEO a hedging instrument in a simple setting where the IB o¤ers only one type of hedging instrument -either just swaps or just PH -for sale. Section 4 expands upon the analysis of Section 3 by examining the CEO's demand for hedging instruments when the IB o¤ers both swaps and PH for sale. In that section, we show that: swaps and PH are always substitutes, the CEO's demand 7 But, as a prelude to his empirical analysis, Gao [2010] developed a simple agency model that also demonstrates that a …rm which anticipates that its CEO will go to an IB to o¤-load some of his compensation risk will boost the PFPS of the CEO's contract. However, his analysis is much less focused on the contract transformation process and the interaction between IBs and CEOs than our analysis. As examples, his analysis is silent on the issue of how the prices IBs charge for the hedges a¤ects CEOs' demands for the hedges, as well as how the availability of multiple hedging instruments from IBs interact to a¤ect CEOs'demand for hedges.
8 Of course, a fundamental di¤erence between earnings management and hedging compensation risk is that, over time, the opportunistic discretionary accruals CEOs have their …rms "book" under earnings management eventually have to be reversed, whereas there need be no corresponding reversals associated with the contract transformation e¤ects of hedging risk through investment banks.
for both hedging instruments increases in the CEO's contract's PFPS, and the CEO's demand for PH increases in each of: the PH's e¤ectiveness (measured by the correlation between the hedge's payo¤s and the CEO's compensation), the marginal productivity of the CEO's e¤ort, and a measure of the CEO's e¤ort aversion, whereas the CEO's demand for swaps decreases in both of these last two variables (the marginal productivity of his e¤ort and the measure of e¤ort aversion), but increases in the variance of the performance measure underlying the CEO's compensation.
In Section 5, we study comparative statics, i.e., how the optimal design of the CEO's PFPS and how the maximal value of the …rm changes with exogenous parameters of the model. We show that provided the prices the IB charges for both of the hedging instruments are not too large, the optimal contract's PFPS strictly increases in the price of the PH and strictly decreases in the price of the swap, whereas the …rm's maximal value moves in the opposite direction: the maximal value of the …rm strictly decreases in the price of the PH and strictly increases in the price of the swap.
In section 6, we determine which of: allowing the CEO to transact directly with the IB or prohibiting the CEO from transacting with the IB but having the …rm itself transact with the IB yields maximum …rm value. We show that if the IB charges actuarially fair prices for both hedges, maximal …rm value is the same regardless of whether the …rm or its CEO transacts with the IB, but if the IB charges above actuarially fair prices for at least one of the two hedges, …rm value is higher by prohibiting the CEO from transacting with the IB and instead transacting itself with the IB. We also show that, regardless of the PH's e¤ectiveness, if the price of the PH is su¢ ciently high and the price of the swap is any amount above its actuarially fair price, then …rm value is highest when neither the CEO nor the …rm itself transacts with the IB. We also show that when the CEO is allowed to hedge through the IB, the stated (resp., e¤ective -i.e., after taking into account the e¤ects of transacting with the IB) value of the optimal contract's PFPS always weakly exceeds (resp., is always weakly less than) the PFPS of the optimal contract were no IB available for hedging.
In Section 7 we study an extension of the base model where the CEO has better knowledge about the e¤ectiveness of PH hedges than does the …rm; there, we identify conditions under which the …rm may be better o¤ or worse o¤ delegating the decision to transact with the IB to the CEO. We also …nd conditions under which the …rm is better o¤ prohibiting the CEO from transacting with the IB at the same time the …rm …nds it undesirable to hedge the CEO's compensation risk on its own. Section 8 concludes the article. The Appendix contains proofs of most results stated in the text, with omitted proofs available from the authors.
Base Model Setup
We study two principal classes of compensation hedges: swaps and PHs. 9 In a swap, a risk-neutral IB o¤ers to pay the CEO a …xed amount in return for receiving an (endogenously determined) fraction of the variable portion of the CEO's compensation. In a PH, an IB supplies the CEO with a …nancial instrument whose cash ‡ows we posit negatively covary with the performance measure used to determine the variable portion of the CEO's compensation. 10 Without loss of generality, we presume the expected present value of the cash ‡ows generated per unit of the PH is zero. These two instruments cover the principal means by which IBs can assist CEOs in reducing the risk in their compensation contracts: either an IB can reduce the risk in a CEO's compensation contract directly by absorbing some of that risk (in the form of the …xed-for-variable swap) or indirectly by helping the CEO hedge the variability in the performance measure underlying the CEO's compensation (in the form of the PH). These two risk reduction methods are broadly consistent with, and span a signi…cant portion of the space of, hedging instruments commonly used in practice under names such as variable prepaid forward contracts, costless collars, etc.
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In the following analysis, we take the price $q IBs charge for each unit of the PH, along with the "price"/haircut l IBs charge for the swap (as described further below), as exogenously given. We do not assume that these prices are actuarially fair to allow for the possibility that IBs have market power.
12 9 We do not study "real" hedges, i.e., those that reduce the variability of the …rm's performance directly, such as locating some operations overseas as a means of hedging foreign exchange risk or exploiting the diversi…cation advantages of conglomerates. Though such real hedges are potentially important alternative risk management devices, we do not study them here for three reasons: …rst, unlike …nancial hedges, real hedges do not appear to be the subject of outrage in Congress or concern in the …nancial press; second, to shorten this article; and third, we study "real" hedges in a separate working paper. 1 0 Obviously, whether the covariance between the PH and the performance measure is positive or negative is irrelevant to the economic value of the PH and, hence, to our analysis. We choose the covariance to be negative, so that hedging the performance measure will entail having the CEO going "long" the hedge.
It is useful at this point also to address a question initially raised by a referee as to why an IB can construct hedges that an operating …rm cannot construct on its own. On a corporate level, it is well known that investment banks market and sell hedges that are speci…cally tailored to their clients' needs. For example, consider the following excerpt of an advertisement by the Australian investment bank ANZ: "ANZ Investment Bank is a market leader in the Australian and international Capital Markets and has the capacity to tailor speci…c solutions to the needs of Natural Resources clients by providing a comprehensive range of products and services such as: investigating the hedging needs of your company; the ability to model proposed hedging outcomes based on ANZ Investment Bank's proprietary hedging models; designing interest rate solutions that accommodate your risk pro…le and corporate strategy." As the above excerpt asserts, these hedging services often exploit proprietary models that no operating company can easily duplicate. Moreover, even if an operating company could duplicate some of the hedging services o¤ered by an IB, the operating company inevitably has a cost disadvantage relative to an IB in doing so, since not only do IBs employ people speci…cally to provide such functions, IBs can sell the same or similar services to multiple clients, and so, exploit economies of scale that an individual operating company cannot. Related, several empirical papers in the literature document that IBs provide tailored hedges for executive compensation. See, e.g., Bettis, Bizjak, and Lemmon [2001] and Bettis, Bizjak, and Kalpathy [2010] .
1 1 See, e.g, Jagolinzer, Matsunaga, and Yeung [2007] , IRS [2007] , or Sasseen [BloombergBusinessweek, 2010] . 1 2 There is concern about IB's market power: the Financial Conduct Authority (FCA) in the United Kingdom initiated a study in July 2014 to investigate the competitiveness of the investment banking market. Details are available at:
http://www.osborneclarke.com/connected-insights/blog/fca-review-competition-investment-
The assumed sequence of events in the model is as follows. First, the …rm gives the CEO a contract.
The contract must meet the CEO's opportunity cost of working for the …rm, i.e., satisfy the CEO's individual rationality (IR) constraint. Second, the CEO decides how much of the PH to buy and what size swap to engage in with the IB. 13 When the CEO decides to buy either hedge, he pays for the hedge. Third, the CEO privately selects his (operating) e¤ort choice. Finally, all random variables realize their values, the CEO is paid, and the IB and the CEO settle up with each other.
The sequence of events is detailed in Figure 1 below after more features of the model are speci…ed.
The random variableṽ denotes the performance measure the …rm uses to compensate the CEO.
v could be the …rm's operating cash ‡ows, net earnings, etc. The random variableỹ denotes the cash ‡ows per unit of the PH the IB o¤ers to sell the CEO. We take the compensation contract the …rm gives the CEO to be linear, i.e., s p (ṽ) = c p + b pṽ ; where c p is the contract's base salary and b p is the contract's PFPS. 14 We assume this contract is observable to the IB. If the CEO subsequently "lays o¤" or swaps the quantity ṽ of the variable portion of his compensation contract in return for receiving the …xed payment c IB = c IB ( jb p ) from the IB (how c IB is determined is described below) and, at the same time, the CEO purchases^ units of the PH, then the CEO's net payo¤ whenṽ = v andỹ = y is given by Given this background information, we can describe the primary questions we seek to address as:
…rst, for a given contract s p (v) the …rm o¤ers the CEO, how does the CEO optimally transform this banking-and-corporate-banking. Also, researchers have documented that pro…ts accrue to banks due to vendor lock-in e¤ects: once an investment bank establishes a relationship with a client, it exploits that relationship in setting fees for other services it o¤ers to that client. See, e.g., Schenone [2010] and Bharath, Dahiya, Saunders, and Srinivasan [2007] . Finally, there is evidence that IBs charge customized fees for the services they o¤er (see, e.g., http://www.crossbordermanagement.com/en/guides/mergers-a-acquisitions-in-the-us/investmentbankers/investment-bankers-fees).
1 3 Implicitly, we assume in the following that the CEO cannot precommit not to transact with the IB. Later in the paper, when we consider the possibility that the …rm transacts directly with the IB rather than letting the CEO transact with the IB, we further assume that the …rm can preclude the CEO from directly transacting with the IB if it so chooses. 1 4 Bushman and Indjejikian [1993] , Datar, Lambert, and Kulp [2001] , and Lambert [2001] among others, have shown how the use of linear contracts can help generate a variety of useful predictions.
contract into the revised contract T (v; yjc IB ; ;^ ; s p ); second, and related, how do the CEO's optimal demands for the two risk-reducing instruments, the PH and the swap, vary with the contract the …rm gives the CEO; third, how does the …rm's anticipation of the CEO's subsequent transactions with the IB a¤ect the …rm's initial design of the CEO's contract; and …nally, when is the expected value of the …rm higher if the …rm allows the CEO to transact with the IB than if the …rm prohibits the CEO from transacting with the IB? 15 Before continuing, we note some di¤erences between adding the PHỹ as a contracting variable derived from the CEO transacting with the IB and incorporating another variable into a contract in a standard principal-agent (P-A) contracting relationship. In the standard P-A relationship, the desirability of incorporating another variable into the contract is determined by Holmstrom's [1979] "informativeness criterion." The conditions under which the agency relationship improves here by allowing the CEO to transact with the IB should not be expected to coincide with the "informativeness criterion" condition because the "informativeness criterion" determines when the agency relationship improves by including an extra variable in the contract only when that variable: (a) is observable to both the principal and agent, (b) is contractible, (c) is incorporated into the contract at the time the contract is written, and (d) is costless to acquire and incorporate into the contract. In contrast, in the present analysis, we study when the expected value of a …rm increases by allowing its manager to acquire a hedge from an IB under circumstances where the hedge: (a) may not be observable to the …rm; (b) is not contracted upon by the …rm; (c) is obtained after the contract between the CEO and the …rm is written; and (d) is acquired from the IB for a positive fee. We wish to thank an anonymous referee for the observation that the CEO can incur risk not simply due to ‡uctuations in the value of the CEO's compensation, but also due to ‡uctuations in the value of his portfolio of assets, which could include holdings in the …rm he works for. While we do not incorporate the e¤ects of ‡uctuations in the value of the CEO's portfolio in our formal analysis, our analysis could be extended to incorporate such e¤ects. In this footnote, we brie ‡y sketch what we believe to be the major e¤ect of introducing these random wealth e¤ects into our analysis. LetW denote the random variable describing the CEO's end-of-period wealth not deriving from the CEO's compensation, so that if the CEO were given the compensation contract cp + bpṽ, then the CEO's total end of period wealth isW + cp + bpṽ. Assume thatW andṽ are jointly normally distributed. Then, as is well known, the conditional expectation E[W jv] is linear and given by, say, c + bv, and the residual" W E[W jṽ] is independent ofṽ: Let 2 " denote the variance of". It follows that the variance in the CEO's end of period wealth is given by: var(bpṽ +W ) = var(bpṽ + bṽ +") = (bp + b) 2 2 v + 2 " , and so, if the CEO selected e¤ort a and did not transact with the IB, then his certainty equivalent would be given by:
It is clear, upon comparing this expression for the CEO's certainty equivalent with the corresponding expression in the text, that the main consequence of introducing the CEO's non-compensation related wealth into the analysis is to increase the contract's e¤ective PFPS by the amount b. While introducing this exogenous increase in the contract's PFPS will a¤ect some of our computations, we believe it is unlikely that the introduction of this extra term fundamentally alters our analysis.
1 6 Another signi…cant di¤erence between our analysis and Holmstrom [1979] is that the "informativeness criterion" determines when to include an additional variable in a contract only when the principal can choose publicly and optimally how much weight to place on the extra variable in the contract. The "informativeness criterion" says nothing about the desirability of including an extra variable in a contract when the weight assigned to that variable in the contract is some quantity other than the optimal weight derived in Holmstrom's [1979] analysis, When a CEO is deciding what quantity of a PH to purchase from an IB, he is not constrained in his choice of the quantity of the PH to purchase, and there is nothing to suggest that his preferred quantity will match up with the …rm's optimal weighting of that hedging We next describe the distributions of the random variablesṽ andỹ, and also the terms of the swap, i.e., the relationship between the …xed payment c IB and the stochastic quantity ṽ of variable portion of the CEO's compensation the CEO transfers to the IB. We suppose that if the CEO takes unobservable e¤ort a 0, then the distribution of performance measureṽ has mean wa, where w > 0 is a constant representing the CEO's marginal productivity of e¤ort, and variance 2 v : As noted above, we take the mean E[ỹ] of the PH to be zero and the covariance vy = cov(ỹ;ṽ) to be negative (and hence the associated correlation also to be negative). We denote the variance ofỹ by 2 y : Initially, we take these characteristics of the distributions of these random variables to be common knowledge. In Section 7 below, we consider an extension where the CEO has better information about the e¤ectiveness of the PHỹ in hedgingṽ than does the …rm; i.e., better information about the covariance vy .
As was mentioned above, we suppose that the IB imposes a "haircut" on the CEO in executing the …xed-for-variable swap. That is, we assume there is a constant fraction l 2 [0; 1) such that the …xed payment c IB = c IB ( jb p ) the IB gives the CEO in return for receiving the random payment ṽ is only 1 l times the expected value of ṽ: We also suppose there are constants k > 0 and r > 0 such that if the CEO consumes the random quantityt after selecting e¤ort a 0, then the CEO's certainty equivalent is given by CE(t; a) E[tja] :5rV ar(t) :5a 2 =k: That is, the CEO has preferences that are additively separable in consumption and e¤ort, the CEO has linear meanvariance preferences for consumption, and the CEO's disutility from exerting e¤ort a is given by :5a 2 =k . Thus, the higher r, the more risk-averse the CEO, and the higher k, the less e¤ort-averse the CEO. This is consistent with preferences as employed in the so-called LEN contracting framework (see, e.g., Lambert [2001] ). It follows that the CEO's certainty equivalent from exerting e¤ort a and consumingT = T (ṽ;ỹjc IB ; ;^ ; s p ); where T (ṽ;ỹjc IB ; ;^ ; s p ) is as de…ned in (1) above, is given by:
(the preceding uses the facts that E[ṽja] = wa and E[ỹ] = 0): Consequently, given the transformed contract T (ṽ;ỹjc IB ; ;^ ; s p ), it is clear that the CEO's preferred action choice a, denoted a (b p ; ), is given by
The CEO's optimal e¤ort is increasing in each of: his RRI (recall (2)) in the original compensation contract, the marginal productivity of his e¤ort, and the extent to which he is not e¤ort averse. It variable.
follows from (4) that the CEO's certainty equivalent (3) evaluated at this optimal action is given by
(4) implies that the expected value of the variable portion of the …xed-for-variable swap ṽ is given by E[ṽja (b p ; )] = (b p )w 2 k, and so, given the haircut l; the relationship between the variable portion ṽ of the contract transferred to the IB and the …xed payment c IB received by the CEO in the …xed-for-variable swap is given by:
The analysis proceeds by maintaining the following bounds on the haircut l:
The requirement that the haircut l be less that 1 needs no explanation. The requirement that
; which is equivalent to the requirement that (1 2l)w
to ensure satisfaction of the second-order condition for the problem of maximizing the CEO's certainty equivalent with respect to . 18 The condition that l <
is necessary to ensure that the CEO's interaction with the IB is sensible, in so far as the CEO uses the IB to o¤-load compensation risk, rather than to acquire additional compensation risk, by having access to the swap.
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The sequence of events is summarized in Figure 1 . 20 The …rm
The CEO buys^ units of the The CEO The realized value of o¤ers the CEO PHỹ and swaps fraction =b p privately the …rm's cash ‡ows the contract of the variable portion of his takes occur, and all contracts
contract in return action a: are settled. The for receiving the …xed CEO consumes. amount c IB :
A foresightful …rm who anticipates the CEO's optimally transacting with the IB will solve the following program. In this program, the quantity (ljb p ; q) denotes the CEO's demand for the swap 1 7 Even though the IB does not observe the CEO's action choice, the IB can infer the CEO's optimal action choice a (bp; ), since: 1. the …rm's original contract is observable to the IB (in particular, the IB sees bp); 2: as a party to the swap, the IB sees ; and 3. since the IB knows the entire information set of the CEO's decision problem, the IB can compute a (bp; ):
1 8 See the appendix at (42) and notice that the coe¢ cient of in RHS(42), which can be rewritten as (1 2l)w 2 k + r 2 v (1 2 ); equals the negative of the second-order condition for a maximum for optimizing the CEO's certainty equivalent.
1 9 See (43) in the appendix, and note that l <
is necessary for + (bpjq; l) to be positive when q = 0. 2 0 The order in which the CEO purchases the PH and swap from the IB is irrelevant as long as both hedges are purchased before the CEO selects his operating action choice.
given the haircut l (which is the "price" of the swap), the PFPS b p of the original contract, and the price q per unit of the PH. The quantity^ (qjb p ; l) denotes the CEO's demand for the PH as a function of these same three variables.
Program 1 (Optimal contracting when the CEO transacts directly with the IB) max sp(ṽ)=cp+bpṽ;a (bp; ); (ljbp;q);^ (qjbp;l)
subject to for each b p and , a (b p ; ) is as in (4) above;
for each b p and , c IB ( jb p ) is as in (6) above; (9)
Constraint (8) ensures that the CEO's optimal action choice is determined correctly, given whatever RRI the CEO keeps in the original contract. Constraint (9) ensures that the terms of the swap are de…ned consistently with the IB charging the CEO a haircut of l: Constraint (10) ensures that the two functions (ljb p ; q) and^ (qjb p ; l) represent the CEO's demand curves for the swap and for the PH, respectively. We impose the restriction^ 0 since we (reasonably) posit that the CEO cannot be a source or supplier of the PH, 21 and we impose the restrictions b p and 0; since (a) a nonnegative "haircut" only makes sense for 0 22 and (b) we also (reasonably) suppose that the CEO cannot be a source or supplier for swaps. Constraint (11) is the CEO's individual rationality constraint when the CEO's opportunity cost of working for the …rm is U : In the following, without loss of generality, we set U = 0:
2 1 Expanding on this last point, it is theoretically possible (absent this constraint) for^ < 0 to occur, in which case the CEO would be using the PH not to hedge but to increase the variance in his compensation contract. We do not study this possibility for two reasons: …rst, because, as far as we know, this theoretical possibility never arises in practice. Second, since we want to re ‡ect the IB's potential market power by letting the IB charge the CEO a price $q=unit of the PH that is potentially above its actuarially fair price (zero), no market-power exploiting IB would agree to pay the CEO $q=unit if the CEO could somehow synthesize the PH on his own and the CEO sought to sell the synthesized PH to the IB. (If such an odd situation were somehow to arise, the IB -in exercising his market power -would agree to purchase PH from the CEO only by buying the PH at a less than actuarially fair price (i.e., the IB would insist on getting paid to receive PHs synthesized by the CEO).) Thus, to properly re ‡ect the IB's potential market power, the price of $q=unit of the PH is applicable only when the CEO's demand for the PH is nonnegative.
2 2 Expanding on this point, we assert that positive haircuts (i.e., l > 0) make economic sense only when is nonnegative. No IB would agree to pay the CEO a positive haircut when < 0, as a positive haircut when < 0 would imply that the IB receives a lower payment c IB (>0) than he would with a zero haircut, as:
For economically sensible interpretations of haircuts in the following, we con…ne attention to those parameter values for which the optimal is nonnegative.
Notice that while Program 1 is written assuming the IB can sell the CEO both PH and swaps, this program can be easily modi…ed to cover the special cases where the IB is limited to selling the CEO just swaps (by adding the additional constraint^ 0) or just performance hedges (by adding the constraint 0): We exploit this observation when stating and deriving Theorems 1 and 2 in the next section.
Before concluding this section, we note that throughout the rest of the article, we maintain the assumption that w 2 k r Before describing the solution to the general problem in Program 1 where the IB o¤ers to sell both hedging devices to the CEO, in this section we consider each of the two special cases where the IB o¤ers only one type of hedge, either just swaps or just performance hedges. We do this as a way of developing intuition for the solution to the general problem. In the …rst theorem below, we consider the situation where the IB o¤ers to sell only swaps to the CEO.
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Theorem 1 When the CEO is allowed to transact with the IB, but the IB only o¤ ers to sell swaps, then:
(a) if the …rm gives the CEO a contract with stated PFPS b p > 0; then the optimal variable portion of the contract the CEO sells the IB is:
and the CEO's optimal retained residual interest in this contract is:
; (c) the e¤ ective PFPS of the optimal contract is:
; and (d) the value of the …rm evaluated at the optimal contract is:
Regarding part (a), notice that for all l in the interval (7),
given a contract with stated PFPS b p > 0, then part (a) shows that the net e¤ect of allowing the CEO to transact with the IB is to "knock down" the PFPS of the contract to b p
To see this, observe that the CEO when given this contract will choose action a = bpwk; and hence, will obtain certainty equivalent from the contract of
@CE @bp
> 0 if and only if w 2 k r 2 v > 0: 2 4 We do not present the proof of Theorem 1 in the appendix as a self-contained result, since the solution to Theorem 1 is a special case of the general solution to Program 1 when the price q for the PH is set above the CEO's reservation price.
shows the incentive compromising e¤ects of allowing the CEO to transact with the IB, and hence that some of the concerns voiced by senators and others cited in the Introduction regarding hedging by CEOs are at least sometimes justi…ed.
Perhaps somewhat unexpectedly, part (a) shows that this e¤ect occurs regardless of the size of the initial PFPS of the …rm's original contract, as long as that PFPS is positive. That is, the CEO always knocks down the incentive e¤ects of the original contract. 25 This last result is in fact extremely general; 26 it is a consequence of the observation that any risk-averse person subject to moral hazard in any insurance-related setting will buy a positive quantity of insurance provided the insurance is "not too actuarially unfair;" in our setting, "not too actuarially unfair" entails that the haircut l belong to the interval (7). 27 An additional implication of part (a) is that were an unforesightful …rm to fail to anticipate that the CEO will transact with the IB, then the CEO will work less hard than what the …rm expected him to (as can be seen by observing that (4) is increasing in the CEO's RRI in the original contract).
Part (b) reports that the optimal value of the stated PFPS b p (l) the …rm gives the CEO is speci…ed
. 28 The optimal stated PFPS is always decreasing in the haircut l: This is intuitive because the …rm ultimately bears the cost of the haircut, in so far as the …rm has to compensate the CEO well enough so that, inclusive of the haircut the CEO pays the IB, the CEO gets high enough expected utility so as to be willing to work for the …rm. As the haircut increases, the …rm reduces the PFPS he o¤ers the CEO so as to economize on these costs.
The case where the IB charges the CEO no haircut (l = 0) is of special interest. In that case, in view of part (b), b p = 1: If the CEO did not subsequently transact with the IB, i.e., if we 2 5 Part (a) follows directly from (16) below, specialized to the case whereres (bpjl): 2 6 It requires only that the CEO be risk averse and that the contract sp(v) be strictly increasing; it does not require any assumptions such as CARA preferences, linear contracts, or normal distributions. It also holds when the IB is posited to o¤er both PH and swaps for sale. (The proof of this general claim is omitted from the text, but available from the authors.) 2 7 To see this, substitute (6) into (5), and evaluate the result at q =^ = 0 (which is appropriate presently where the IB is presumed to only o¤ers swaps for sale), to …nd the CEO's certainty equivalent in the context of Theorem 1 as equal to:
The derivative of this certainty equivalent with respect to is in general given by:
Evaluating this derivative at = 0 we obtain
Thus, for all bp > 0, we see that this derivative is positive, i.e., the CEO has an incentive to purchase a positive amount of the swap from the IB, provided (1 l)w 2 k (w 2 k :5r 2 v ) = lw 2 k + :5r 2 v > 0: This last inequality holds for all haircuts l less than were considering a standard principal-agent contracting problem where the CEO was restricted to consuming what the …rm paid him, then a contract with b p = 1 would be interpreted as "selling (or renting) the entire …rm to the CEO"for the price of the (negative of) base salary c p : When the …rm is risk-neutral and the CEO is risk averse, such a contract is undesirable, because it imposes too much risk on the CEO. It is easy to check that the solution to the standard contracting problem in this case (when attention is paid to linear contracts) is to give the CEO a contract of the form c p + b p v, where
This contract optimally trades o¤ the incentive e¤ects of CEO's compensation against both the risk the contract imposes on the CEO's consumption and the CEO's cost in exerting e¤ort. Notice that in the contracting problem we are presently concerned with (where the CEO can lay o¤ some or all of the risk in his compensation contract by transacting with the IB) when l = 0, the …rm sets the CEO's contract at b p = 1, so it follows that, as part (c) reports, the CEO's e¤ective PFPS is given by
; hence, the CEO's e¤ective PFPS is identical to the PFPS of the contract the CEO would have been given had no IB, or no transactions with the IB, been available, as we reported in (12).
More generally, part (c) shows, by combining the results of parts (a) and (b) , that the optimal e¤ective PFPS is the stated PFPS of the optimal contract times the optimal fraction of the stated PFPS the CEO retains, i.e., is 1 1+l
From this last expression, it is easy to verify that regardless of the size of the haircut l (subject only to the haircut belonging to the interval (7)), that the CEO's e¤ective PFPS associated with the optimal contract is always (weakly) below the e¤ective PFPS of the optimal contract reported in (12) had the CEO been forbidden from transacting with the IB.
Part (d) reports that the …rm's value is given by
29 (The subscript A indicates that the …rm is allowing the CEO to transact with the IB.) It is easy to check that
w 2 k ) and hence for all l in (7). The …rm is worse o¤ the higher the value of the haircut, and the …rm's value is highest when the haircut is zero, in which case the …rm's
. From the discussion of parts (b) and (c), one might conjecture that when the haircut is zero, the value of the …rm is the same when the CEO is allowed to transact with the IB as when there is no IB (and hence, the CEO consumes exactly what the …rm paid him.) Using the expression V A (l) for the …rm's value along with (12) ; this conjecture can be veri…ed to be true. The preceding discussion shows that, whenever the haircut on the swaps is strictly positive, …rm value is strictly lower when the CEO is allowed to buy swaps from the IB than when no swaps are available.
In summary, when the only hedge available through an IB is a swap and the CEO is allowed to transact with the IB, then while the CEO will always take advantage of the opportunity to engage in a swap (for all haircuts in the interval (7)), the …rm is always weakly worse o¤ as a consequence of this opportunity; when the …rm anticipates that the CEO will engage in the swap, the …rm will boost the PFPS of the contract he o¤ers the CEO (relative to what he would have o¤ered had the CEO not had access to the IB), but notwithstanding this "boosting," the CEO's e¤ective PFPS is always (at least weakly) below what it would have been had the CEO been forbidden from transacting with the IB.
In the next theorem below, we consider the situation where the IB only o¤ers to sell the CEO PH.
To present this theorem, we make use of three additional constructs: the …rst-best quantity F B of the PH and the CEO's two "reservation prices" q res (b p ) and q res for the PH. F B is that that minimizes var(ṽ + ỹ): It is well known (see, e.g., Hull [2007] ) that
For a given PFPS b p , the reservation price q res (b p ) is the least upper bound of all prices q for the PH at which the CEO's demand for the PH is positive. The reservation price q res is the least upper bound on the prices q at which the CEO's demand for the PH is positive when evaluated at the optimal contract that solves the version of Program 1 where the IB is restricted to selling only PH to the CEO.
Theorem 2 When the CEO is allowed to transact with the IB, but the IB only o¤ ers to sell the PH, then:
(a) if the …rm gives the CEO a contract with stated PFPS b p > 0, then the CEO's optimal demand for the PH is:^
(b) the optimal contract's stated (and also, in this case, e¤ ective) PFPS is:
and
, ifres ; and (c) the value of the …rm evaluated at the optimal contract is:
Part (a) of Theorem 2 shows that the amount of PH the CEO buys is increasing in the PFPS b p of the contract the …rm o¤ers him. This makes sense, since the CEO is subject to more risk the bigger b p is: Part (a) also shows that the CEO's demand curve for the PH is downward sloping: as q rises, the CEO's demand for the PH falls. This is as one would naturally expect. Part (b) shows that if the price of PH is so high that the CEO does not purchase any PH from the IB, then the e¤ective (which in the context of Theorem 2 is the same as the stated) PFPS of the optimal contract,
is the same as the e¤ective PFPS of the optimal contract under the terms of Theorem 1 when the haircut l there is zero. At those high prices for the PH, the contracting environment in the present case where only PH is available through the IB and in the contracting environment where only the swap is available through the IB are the same, and so it is not surprising that the …rm o¤ers the CEO a contract with the same e¤ective PFPS in both environments. Part (b) also shows that for those prices q of the PH below its reservation price, as q rises the PFPS of the optimal contract declines. This is a natural result in view of part (a), since part (a) shows that as the PFPS of the contract the …rm gives the CEO increases, the CEO hedges more. It follows naturally that, as the cost of hedging rises, the …rm will induce the CEO to buy less PH by subjecting the CEO to less risk by lowering b p :
Part (c) displays the value of the …rm when evaluated at the optimal contract as a function of the price q per unit of the PH. Comparing this value to its counterpart in Theorem 1(d), we see that if the IB charges actuarially fair prices in the case when he just sells swaps (at l = 0) and also when he just sells PH (at q = 0), then it is apparent that the …rm value in Theorem 2(c) is strictly higher by allowing the CEO to buy only the PH from the IB than by allowing the CEO to buy only the swap from the IB. That is,
; where the latter value follows from Theorem 1(d). This is intuitive: the availability of the swap at actuarially fair rates does nothing to improve the principal-agent contracting relationship that the …rm could not do on its own, whereas the availability of the PH at actuarially fair rates permits the …rm to o¤er the CEO a contract with strictly improved risk-sharing properties. Also, this expression for …rm value can be shown to be strictly decreasing in q for q < q res , and is continuous at q = q res . Since …rm value at q > q res equals what the value of the …rm would be were no hedges available, we can conclude from this discussion that by allowing the CEO to transact with the IB when the IB only o¤ers PH for sale, …rm value is strictly higher than what …rm value would have been were no hedges available, provided q < q res :
4 CEOs'demand curves for the PH and the swap when both hedging instruments are available through the IB
In this section, we take the …rst step toward solving Program 1 in the general case where the IB o¤ers both the PH and the swap to the CEO concurrently by explicitly calculating the CEO's joint demand curves for both the PH and the swap. This section also includes a variety of comparative statics related to those two demand curves.
To begin, suppose the CEO, upon being given the contract s p (v) = c p +b p v; purchases quantity^ of the PH, swaps the variable amount ṽ in return for receiving the …xed payment c IB ( jb p ) as speci…ed in (6), and then chooses his action optimally in accordance with (4): Throughout the remainder of the article, we write^ as the product:^ = (b p ) , i.e., is the quantity of the PH per unit of the agent's RRI. Substituting this expression for^ into (5), we see that the CEO's certainty equivalent can be written as:
Maximizing this certainty equivalent jointly with respect to the choice of both and yields the CEO's demand curves for both the PH and the swap as reported in the following theorem.
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Theorem 3 When the CEO is allowed to transact with the IB, the IB o¤ ers to sell the CEO both the PH and the swap, and the …rm gives the CEO the contract s p (v) = c p + b p v with b p > 0, then:
(a) the CEO's demand curve for the …xed-for-variable swap is:
(1 2l)w 2 k+r 2 v ; and
(b) the CEO's demand curve for the PH is:
While the demand curves in Theorem 3 appear similar to those that appear in Theorems 1 and 2, they are distinct. It is easy to con…rm that the demand for the swap (ljb p ; q) as it appears in (16) is identical to the demand for the swap (ljb p ) as it appears in Theorem 1 when, in the former case, the correlation between the performance measureṽ and the PHỹ is set equal to zero and the price q for the PH is taken to be above the reservation price for the PH. Similarly, the demand for the PĤ (qjb p ; l) as it appears in (17) is identical to the demand for the PH^ (qjb p ) as it appears in Theorem 2 when in the former case the haircut l is set equal to 0. The explanation for these similarities is obvious: when only one hedging instrument is available from the IB, the price of the "other" hedging instrument does not appear in the CEO's demand curve for the hedging instrument that is available, and the non-price e¤ects of the "other" variable on the CEO's demand curve for available hedging instrument (the e¤ect of improved risk sharing in the case of the PH; and the e¤ect of the haircut on transforming the stated PFPS of the contract the …rm gives the CEO into the contract's e¤ective PFPS in the case of the swap) do not appear either.
The …rst corollary presented below contains comparative statics related to the CEO's demand for the PH when swaps are also available through the IB.
Corollary 1 31 (Comparative statics of the CEO's demand curve for the PH)
When the CEO is allowed to transact with the IB, the IB o¤ ers to sell the CEO both the PH and the swap, and the …rm gives the CEO the contract s p (v) = c p + b p v with b p > 0, then for all q < q res (b p jl) and all l in (7), the CEO's demand curve for the PH is:
(a) strictly decreasing in q;
(b) strictly increasing in the haircut l;
(c) strictly increasing in the PFPS b p ;
(d) strictly increasing in the absolute value of the correlation j j; for all < 0; and (e) strictly increasing in both the CEO's marginal productivity of e¤ ort w and the parameter k determining the CEO's disutility of e¤ ort.
We con…ne discussion here of the corollary to those parts of it that were not discussed in related remarks following Theorem 1, i.e., to parts (b), (d), and (e). Corollary 1(b) demonstrates that the swap and the PH are always substitutes: as the haircut on the swap becomes bigger, the CEO buys a larger quantity of the PH. Intuitively, if both the swap and the PH are o¤ered for sale, as the swap becomes more expensive, i.e., as the haircut gets larger, the CEO will make greater use of the PH.
To explain Corollary 1(d), note that as the absolute value of the correlation j j increases, the PH y becomes more e¤ective as a hedge of the CEO's compensation risk. Holding its price …xed, it is natural that the CEO purchases more of the PH as it becomes more e¤ective. Corollary 1(e) shows that the demand for the PH increases in the CEO's productivity w and also increases as the CEO's disutility of e¤ort declines. This is explained by examining the CEO's optimal RRI in the original contract:
One can con…rm that the CEO's optimal RRI in his original contract increases in both w and k: This is intuitive: as the CEO becomes more productive, or as the CEO experiences lower disutility of e¤ort, the CEO naturally retains a higher fraction of the risky part of the …rm's original contract.
Having retained more risk (in the form of RRI of the original contract), it makes sense for the CEO to buy more insurance (in the form of the PH). This explains Corollary 1(e).
The next corollary presents comparative statics related to the CEO's demand for the swap when PH is also available through the IB. As in the case of the previous corollary, we discuss here only those parts of the corollary that were not discussed in related remarks following Theorem 2, i.e., parts (b), (d), and (e). Corollary 2(b) reinforces the conclusion of Corollary 1(b) that the swap and the PH are substitutes: as the price of the PH increases, the CEO demands a greater quantity of the swap. Corollary 2(d) shows that as the variance in the …rm's performance measure increases, the CEO's demand for swaps increases.
Corollary 2(e) reports that the CEO engages in a smaller swap as either the marginal productivity of the CEO's e¤ort increases or as his disutility of e¤ort declines. The economic forces that explained Corollary 1(e) above also explain Corollary 2(e): since the CEO's preferred RRI in the original contract is increasing as the marginal productivity of the CEO's e¤ort increases or as his disutility of e¤ort declines, the CEO's preferred RRI in the original contract, b p (ljb p ; q); moves in the opposite direction of the CEO's preferred quantity of the …xed-for-variable swap, (ljb p ; q): The e¤ect of an increase in k is explained similarly.
Solution to the …rm' s optimal contracting problem
In this section, we employ the results of the preceding section to determine the solution to the …rm's optimal contracting problem, as described in Program 1 above, where the …rm correctly anticipates how the CEO will transform optimally whatever contract it gives him by transacting with the IB.
We start by taking a generic contract s p (v) = c p + b p v, with b p > 0, and substitute the CEO's demands for the PH and the swap given this contract into the CEO's certainty equivalent (15). By making these substitutions, we obtain expression (19) in the next lemma as the CEO's certainty equivalent.
Lemma 1 Given the contract s p (v) = c p + b p v, with b p > 0, if the CEO chooses his demands for the PH and the swap optimally, his certainty equivalent is:
The expression (19) is useful for determining the CEO's optimal base salary. Given any value for the PFPS b p > 0, a rational …rm will employ (19) to adjust the CEO's base pay so that his IR constraint binds. Recalling the normalization U = 0, it follows that the …rm will adjust the CEO's base salary c p = c p (b p jq; l) so that:
So, the …rm's expected pro…ts from giving the CEO the contract s p (v) = c p (b p jq; l) + b p v are:
Optimizing (21) (a) the optimal PFPS b p (q; l) is:
; and
(b) the optimal value for the base salary, c p (q; l), is given by (20) above, with b p (q; l) replacing b p ;
and (c) the value of the …rm (21) when evaluated at the optimal contract is:
We comment on part (a) of this theorem through the next corollary and the discussion that follows it. (We defer discussion of the economics underlying part (c) of the theorem to the next section.
)
Corollary 3 (The comparative statics of the optimal contract and …rm value). For any l > 0 (in (7)):
(a) the optimal PFPS b p (q; l) is strictly increasing in q over the interval q 2 [0; q res (l));
(c) for any q 2 [0; q res (l)), b p (q; l) is strictly decreasing in both w and k;
(e) V A (q; l); is strictly decreasing in q for all q < q res (l); and (f ) for 2 su¢ ciently large and l :5, V A (q; l) is strictly increasing in l for all q < q res (l):
Understanding the economic factors that in ‡uence the CEO's preferred RRI in the …rm's contract in (18) is key to obtaining intuition about the behavior of the optimal PFPS b p (q; l) described in this corollary. (18) above shows that increases in the price q of the PH; for q 2 [0; q res (l)), lead the CEO to reduce his RRI in the …rm's contract. This is explained as follows: through his choice of RRI in the original contract, the CEO deliberately exposes himself to compensation risk which he can partially hedge by purchasing the PH. As the price q of this hedge increases, the CEO optimally reduces the risk he exposes himself to by reducing his RRI in the original contract. This, in turn, reduces his demand for this (now more expensive) insurance. It follows that an increase in the price q the CEO pays to acquire the PH drags down the incentives of the CEO to work hard, because it reduces the CEO's preferred RRI in the original contract. For all fees in the region (q 2 (0; q res (l))), the …rm optimally o¤sets this change in the CEO's behavior as q increases by increasing the PFPS b p (q; l) of the optimal contract.
When the PH is free (q = 0), obviously the "fee" for the PH in that case creates no incentive drag on the CEO. Whenres (b p jl), (16) implies that
It is clear from (24) that the fee q again imposes no incentive drag on the CEO whenres (l), since for such high fees, the CEO does not buy the PH. Therefore, for such high fees, the …rm chooses the same b p as when q = 0: This explains why the PFPS of the optimal contract increases in q up to (but not including) q = q res (l), and then discontinuously drops at q = q res (l), and then remains at the same level as when q = 0 for allres (l), as Corollary 3(a) and 3(b) report.
Corollary 3(c) reports that for intermediate values of the fee q for acquiring the PH (i.e., for q 2 (0, q res (l)), increasing either the CEO's productivity parameter w or decreasing the CEO's disutility of e¤ort results in the optimal PFPS declining. This is also explained by examining the CEO's RRI in the original contract: we already noted in the discussion of Corollary 1(e) and 2(e) that, for a given PFPS b p , as w or k increase, the CEO optimally increases his RRI in the original contract. Were the contract's PFPS to increase as w or k increases, this would load an excessive amount of risk on the CEO, and so, as Corollary 3(c) reports, the …rm optimally responds to an increase in w or k by reducing the PFPS b p .
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Corollary 3(d) establishes broad conditions under which the optimal PFPS is everywhere declining in the haircut l: This is surprising when juxtaposed to Corollary 3(a), since the latter result establishes general conditions under which the PFPS increases in q: But it makes economic sense. The higher the PFPS of the …rm's original contract, the more the CEO makes use of the swap (Corollary 2(c)).
Given a …xed contract, we know that it is bene…cial to the CEO to make less use of the swap as the haircut l increases by Corollary 2(a); it is also bene…cial to the …rm to have the CEO make less use of the swap too, because ultimately, the …rm pays for the CEO's use of the swap (through the CEO's IR constraint). So, the …rm self-interestedly gets the CEO to use less of the swap as l increases by reducing the PFPS of the optimal contract he awards the CEO.
The conclusion in Corollary 3(e) that …rm value decreases in the price q the IB charges the CEO for the PH when the CEO is allowed to transact with the IB is not surprising if one views the result from the "more costly input"perspective, i.e., that …rm value should be expected to decline as the price of any input (such as the price of the PH) the …rm uses increases. The conclusion in Corollary 3(f) that …rm value increases in the size (or "price") of the haircut l is not surprising if one views the result from the "agency-theoretic perspective"that anything that deters an agent from taking an action the …rm does not want the agent to take (such as buying more of the swap from the IB) is desirable because it makes it less costly for the …rm to satisfy the incentive compatibility constraint related to the action the …rm does want the agent to take. But, what remains to be explained is why the "more costly input"perspective is the appropriate one for understanding the e¤ects of increasing the price q of the PH whereas the "agency theoretic perspective" is the appropriate one for understanding the e¤ects of increasing the price or haircut l of the swap. The "more costly input" perspective is applicable to the PH, because easier access to the PH improves the contracting relationship between the …rm and its CEO by improving risk-sharing; the "agency theoretic perspective" is applicable to the swap because easier access to the swap worsens the contracting relationship between the …rm and its CEO by making the CEO pay for something (reduced PFPS) that the …rm could have supplied to the CEO for free.
Some of the comparative statics presented in Corollary 3 are illustrated in the …gures 2 and 3.
In both …gures, we set w = 5; k = 1; r = 1:5; which is su¢ ciently large to meet the condition in Corollary 3(f). Consistent with Corollary 3(f), …gure 3 shows that the optimal …rm value, V A (q; l); is strictly increasing in l for all q < q res (l): Further, consistent with Corollary 3(e), …gure 3 illustrates that the optimal …rm value, V A (q; l); decreases in q for all q < q res (l) :
The Value of Transacting with the IB
In this section, we determine when …rm value is higher by allowing the CEO to transact with the IB or by prohibiting the CEO from transacting with the IB and, instead, having the …rm itself transact directly with the IB.
When the …rm itself transacts directly with the IB and prohibits the CEO from doing so, the …rm expands the potential space of contracting variables from those that depend just on the performance measureṽ to those that depend on bothṽ andỹ: That is, the space of contracts expands to those of the form s p (v; y) = c p + b p v + d p y, where is the quantity of the PH the …rm buys from the IB.
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(This is the only relevant expansion in the contracting space when the …rm transacts directly with the IB: the …rm would never buy a swap from the IB because the …rm can replicate the e¤ects of any swap with the IB simply by reducing the PFPS of the contract it o¤ers the CEO and avoid incurring the haircut l.)
Observe that when the …rm itself transacts with the IB, the …rm will pay only an in…nitesimal amount to the IB for the PH regardless of the price $q. This is clear since if we start with the contract Of course, the latter contract entails having the …rm purchase half as much of the PH from the IB as does the former contract, and hence involves only half the outlay to the IB. Since this is true for any quantity > 0 of the PH, the observation follows that the …rm's optimal quantity of, and expenditures on, the PH is in…nitesimal. This conclusion obtains because, unlike the case of the (risk-averse) CEO who derives utility from the actual cash ‡ows produced by the PH (because those cash ‡ows help to reduce the total variance in the CEO's hedge-inclusive compensation), the only value a risk-neutral …rm derives from acquiring the PH is its informational value as (a) the latter facilitates contracting with the CEO; and (b) the …rm is indi¤erent as to the amount of variability in the value of its residual claim, and hence, is unconcerned with the total amount of cash ‡ows "thrown o¤" by the PH.
Thus, when the …rm itself transacts with the IB to obtain the PHỹ for contracting purposes, the optimal linear contract the …rm o¤ers the CEO is in the limit (as the quantity of the PH goes to zero) the one that solves Program 2. The notation here is used to distinguish the quantity of the PH purchased by the …rm when it transacts directly with the IB from the quantity^ = (bp ) of the PH purchased by the CEO when the CEO is allowed to transact with the IB. 
The constraints in this program are standard: (25) is the CEO's incentive compatibility constraint and (26) is the CEO's individual rationality constraint. This program does "double duty" in so far when it is solved for = 0, it yields the solution to the …rm's contracting problem when neither the …rm nor its CEO engages in any transactions with the IB.
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The following Proposition records the solution to Program 2. 39 In the statement of the proposition, we let the optimizing value of b p , i.e., the PFPS of the CEO's optimal linear contract when evaluated at the solution to Program 2, be denoted by b F ; where the subscript \F " reminds us that the …rm is transacting directly with IB (and the CEO is prohibited from transacting with the IB). Sometimes, when we wish to emphasize the dependence of b F on the correlation , we write b F ( ) in place of b F :
Also, we let the value of Program 2 at its optimum, i.e., the value of the …rm, be denoted by V F (or V F ( ), as appropriate):
Proposition 1 (Firm value and the form of optimal contracts when the …rm contracts directly with the IB and the …rm forbids the CEO from contracting with the IB)
The contract that solves Program 2 is given by
and …rm value at the optimum equals:
to the statement of the proposition, when the …rm employs the optimal contract, the …rm makes only an in…nitesimal purchase of the PH. Thus, the price q is irrelevant. Also, since it never purchases a swap, the size of the haircut l is irrelevant too. 3 8 As the …rm will not make any use of the PHỹ in contracts of the form sp = cp + bpv + dpỹ unless the correlation is nonzero, and hence, the case of = 0 is tantamount to neither the …rm nor the CEO transacting with the IB: 3 9 The proof is straightforward and omitted.
Proposition 1 identi…es both the solution to Program 2 and the value of the …rm when evaluated at that solution. From Proposition 1, we can immediately conclude that both the value of the …rm and the optimal contract's PFPS are increasing in the e¤ectiveness of the PH, as measured by 2 :
In addition, Proposition 1 establishes that both …rm value and the optimal contract's PFPS when the …rm transacts directly with the IB but the …rm prohibits the CEO from transacting with the IB are higher than when no transactions at all with the IB take place. This last claim follows from Proposition 1 in conjunction with the observation preceding Program 2's statement that Program 2 does "double duty" by also applying to the case where neither the …rm nor the CEO transact with the IB. Hence, when no PH is available, the PFPS of the CEO's optimal contract shrinks to
and the expected value of the …rm shrinks to
and so the two inequalities 0:5 At this point, it is appropriate to discuss what is socially optimal for the agency given that both hedging instruments are available for contracting, while disregarding the distribution of rents among the …rm, the CEO, and the IB, i.e., while disregarding the prices q and l; and the level of the IR constraint U : Based on the analysis we have already performed, it is clear that making the swap available for contracting is of no social value to the agency, since as we previously noted, the …rm can replicate the e¤ects of any swap simply by reducing the CEO's contract's PFPS suitably. It is also clear that the socially optimal use of the PH to the agency is to use the PH at the …rst-best level = F B in exactly the same way the …rm optimally uses the PH when it alone contracts with the IB as was concluded in Proposition 1 above.
Given the preceding observation that swaps are not socially value enhancing, one might ask why swaps, or other similar hedges that e¤ectively duplicate swaps, are available in the marketplace. 40 This has an easy answer: in the marketplace, it is commonplace to see transactions or activities which are not socially valuable but which are demanded by a subsegment of the population. This is particularly true of transactions or activities whose principal function is redistributional. Besides swaps, examples of such activities or transactions include tax motivated structures that are unproductive but reduce the tax payers'tax burden, earnings management activities that decrease a …rm's long-term cash ‡ows 4 0 We include these remarks at the suggestion of one of the referees.
but temporarily boost its reported earnings, etc. When such activities cannot be costlessly stopped or costlessly committed to not being engaged in, then some subsegments of society -but not society as a whole -will bene…t from, and hence seek to engage in, these activities. While we do not mean to discount the possibility of there being other reasons besides their role in redistribution that help to explain the demand for swaps, their redistributive role is more than su¢ cient reason to predict the marketplace's o¤ering of swaps for sale.
In the following corollary, by comparing the expressions for …rm value derived in Proposition 1
and Theorem 4, we obtain further conclusions about which of the following generates highest …rm value: allowing the CEO to transact with the IB, having the …rm transact directly with the IB and prohibiting the CEO from transacting with the IB, or having neither party transaction with the IB.
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Corollary 4 (A comparison of …rm value under alternative contracting scenarios) (a) Firm value is the same when the …rm acquires hedges directly from the IB and the CEO is prohibited from contracting with the IB as when the CEO is allowed to transact with the IB, provided the IB charges actuarially fair prices for both the PH and the swap, i.e.,
(b) Firm value is higher when the …rm acquires hedges directly from the IB and the CEO is prohibited from contracting with the IB than when the CEO is allowed to transact with the IB, provided the IB charges fees that exceed the actuarially fair prices for either the PH or the swap, i.e., V F > V A (q; l) if either one or both of q and l are positive:
(c) Firm value is greater when the CEO is allowed to contract with the IB than when no one (either …rm or CEO) transacts with the IB, provided the prices q and l are su¢ ciently low, i.e., V notrans < V A (q; l) if both q and l are su¢ ciently low:
(d) Firm value is higher when no one transacts with the IB than when the CEO is allowed to transact with the IB for any positive haircut (l > 0 in (7)) the IB charges, provided the price q the IB charges is su¢ ciently close to (but below) the reservation price q res (l), i.e., V notrans > V A (q; l) for any l > 0; provided q is su¢ ciently near (but below) q res (l):
The intuition underlying Corollary 4(a) is simple. If q = l = 0, then according to (18) above, given any contract with bonus coe¢ cient b p , if the …rm allows the CEO to transact with an IB, the CEO's optimal RRI in the original contract is
That is, through his transactions with an IB, the CEO "knocks down" the PFPS of his original contract by the fraction f w 2 k w 2 k+r 2 v (1 2 ) : So, the …rm can restore the incentives of his original contract by "scaling up" the bonus coe¢ cient by 1 f : This can be done in particular for the optimal contract obtained by having the …rm transact directly with the IB (and prohibiting the CEO from doing so), and so the …rm is neither better o¤ nor worse o¤ having the CEO transact with the IB than having the …rm transact with the IB directly and forbidding the CEO from transacting with the IB.
The preceding is an intuitive result. What is perhaps less intuitive is that the same result does not obtain when either q or l is positive. While the …rm will still adjust the contract it o¤ers to account for the CEO's propensity to "knock down"the incentive e¤ects of that contract through transactions with the IB, the …rm will not simply "boost" the incentive e¤ects of the contract it o¤ers to o¤set fully the CEO's "knocking down" those incentive e¤ects. To see this, suppose, for example, that q is so large that the CEO does not purchase any of the PH from the IB, then -as we demonstrated in (24) above -when the …rm gives the CEO a contract with PFPS b p , the fraction of the PFPS the CEO retains is given by
So, were the …rm just interested in retaining the incentive e¤ects of (27), the …rm would give the CEO a contract with PFPS:
But, the …rm does not do that. Instead, as (22) shows, in these circumstances, the …rm optimally o¤ers the CEO a contract with PFPS b p (q; l) = 1 1+l , which is easily shown to be smaller than (32) when l > 0 belongs to the interval (7). Consequently, when l > 0, the …rm does not …nd it optimal to fully restore the CEO's incentives to work hard even when he anticipates the CEO's propensity to transact with the IB. The intuition for this follows from the discussion of Corollary 3(d) above: the haircut the IB charges the CEO for the swap is ultimately paid for by the …rm, since the …rm has to ensure the satisfaction of the CEO's constraint. Hence, to economize on these costs, the …rm reduces the PFPS of the contract it o¤ers the CEO to limit the CEO's propensity to transact with the IB and incur the haircut.
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Regarding Corollary 4(b): one might expect that if the price of the PH q equals zero, then …rm value should be the same whether or not l = 0, under the reasoning that as long as the CEO has access to the PH for free, it should not matter what the size of the haircut is, since the "important" service the IB is providing is access to the PH "for free." The IB's o¤ering of the …xed-for-variable swap to the CEO, in contrast, would not seem to be an "important"service, because the …rm always has a ready -in fact, perfect -substitute for this latter service: the …rm can simply provide the CEO with a contract that has lower powered incentives, i.e., with a smaller PFPS b p . So, this reasoning goes, if the CEO could have the opportunity to buy PH at actuarially fair prices from the IB, it should not matter whether the IB imposes a haircut for swapping compensation risk with the CEO, because the …rm has a perfect substitute for this latter service.
But, the preceding reasoning turns out to be wrong, as Corollary 4(b) reports: as we originally noted in the discussion following Theorem 1, a risk-averse CEO always …nds it irresistible to swap some compensation risk with the IB, even when those swaps take place at actuarially unfair rates, and the expectation that the CEO will engage in such transactions with the IB leads to a reduction in the …rm's value, even when the IB sells the CEO the PH at actuarially fair rates.
Corollary 4(c) reports that even if the IB exercises his market power by charging above actuarially fair prices for the PH and for the service of swapping compensation risk with the CEO and even if the CEO's transactions with the IB reduce the incentive e¤ects of the contract the …rm originally o¤ers him, …rm value can still be higher by allowing the CEO to transact with the IB as compared to having neither the …rm nor the CEO hedge through the IB, provided the premiums the IB charges the CEO for these transactions are not too large. This result follows because having access to the PH is valuable provided the IB does not charge excessively high fees for that access.
Corollary 4(d) indicates that …rm value when the CEO hedges his compensation risk by transacting realized value ofṽ (and, hence, bṽ) is small. In the event the CEO is wealth-constrained, a contract with such "reverse payments" may be infeasible. While we do not pursue the study of this possibility (of manager's limited wealth) in the text, in this footnote, we brie ‡y consider this situation. In particular, we suppose here that the CEO has no outside wealth and so the CEO's compensation must always be nonnegative. We also suppose thatṽ is also always nonnegative (which would be true (and compatible with other assumptions we have already made if, for example, when the CEO takes action a,ṽ is distributed uniformly on [0, 2aw]): Combined with our other maintained assumptions (which include the speci…cation U = 0), we conclude in this case that the CEO's base pay c optimally will be set equal to zero. That is, all of the CEO's compensation will consist of just variable pay, bpṽ. The optimal bp is then computed by …rst substituting the optimal value for the CEO's retained residual interest bp (ljbp; q) into the pro…t function (21), where (ljbp; q) is as reported in Theorem 3, and then maximizing with respect to the choice of bp: When q is below the CEO's reservation price, it is easy to show that the optimal bp is given by
: It is clear from this last expression that this value for b p is strictly increasing in l; and so the stated value of the PFPS will be increasing in the haircut when the IR constraint does not bind. In contrast, if q is above the CEO's reservation price, it is easy to show (by using the same procedure as above) that the optimal value for bp is bp = 1 2 independent of the size of the haircut. Thus, whether the …rm will boost the PFPS of the contract it gives its CEO, as well as how this boosting changes with the haircut l, depends at least sometimes on whether the IR constraint for the CEO is binding.
We wish to thank an anonymous referee for suggesting that we undertake the preceding analysis.
with the IB can be lower than …rm value when no transactions with the IB take place, even when the IB charges the CEO a trivially small, but positive, haircut, as long as the price q the IB charges the CEO for the PH is su¢ ciently near the CEO's reservation price for the PH. While it might be thought that the CEO has an incentive to eschew transacting with an IB when such transactions will result in the …rm's value dropping below what the …rm's value would have been if all transactions with the IB were prohibited, this is not true. In other words, Corollary 4(d) identi…es a "hold-up problem" (see, e.g., Aghion and Bolton [1992] ) for the …rm that is so severe that, even though the IB has a resource (the PH) that is valuable to the agency, and even though the …rm anticipates the CEO's transacting with an IB when designing the contract, the …rm is worse o¤ than it would have been had all transactions with the IB been eliminated. However, unlike the results in traditional "hold-up problems," Corollary 4(c) demonstrates that the CEO's opportunity to engage in ex post hedging does not always destroy …rm value. Thus, whether the manager's opportunity to engage in hedging is value-destroying hinges on the magnitudes of the prices q and l, as described in Corollary
4(c) and (d).
We conclude this section by comparing the optimal contract's PFPS when hedges are available to the optimal contract's PFPS were there no hedges. When hedging opportunities exist, we refer to the expression b p (q; l) for the optimal PFPS in Theorem 4 as the optimal stated PFPS, and the expression b p (ljb p ; q) for the CEO's optimal retained residual interests in (18) and (24) Corollary 5 For all l in (7) and all q 0, when the …rm allows the CEO to transact with an IB:
(a) the stated PFPS of the optimal contract that solves Program 1 always weakly exceeds the PFPS of the optimal contract when no hedging opportunities exist;
(b) the e¤ ective PFPS of the optimal contract that solves Program 1 is always weakly less than the PFPS of the optimal contract when no hedging opportunities exist.
This last corollary demonstrates that were one to formulate hypotheses about the e¤ect of hedging on the design of compensation contracts, it is important to be speci…c about what particular PFPS one is referring to. Because the …rm anticipates the CEO will "knock down" a portion of his incentive pay by o¤-loading it onto an IB, the …rm optimally responds by boosting the stated PFPS of the contract he gives the CEO to an amount that always weakly exceeds the PFPS associated with the optimal contract were no hedges available. But, the net e¤ect of the CEO knocking back down the PFPS of the …rm's original contract is to give the CEO lower powered incentives than had no hedging possibilities existed, as this corollary reports. This phenomenon is explored further in the next section.
7 When the CEO has superior private information about PH' s e¤ectiveness
In this section, we extend the base model by considering the situation where the CEO has better knowledge of the PH's e¤ectiveness, as measured by the correlation between the PHỹ and the performance measureṽ, than the …rm. This is a practically realistic and important extension, in so far as managers are likely to know many operational details about the …rms they are hired to run not known by the …rm's owners, and in particular, managers are likely to know more about the joint distribution betweenṽ andỹ than the …rms'owners. Through this extension, we can determine how information asymmetry between a …rm and its CEO about a hedge's e¤ectiveness a¤ects each of: the …rm's value, the contract the …rm gives the CEO, and the CEO's optimal contract transformation choices.
The assumptions underlying the model of this section are the same as those of the base model except that now we assume that: (a) the PH's e¤ectiveness is state-dependent and the CEO knows the state before working for the …rm, but the …rm never acquires this information about the state; (b) the …rm wants to hire the CEO regardless of the PH's e¤ectiveness, i.e., regardless of the state; and (c) the …rm does not make use of "communication based contracts," that is, the …rm gives the CEO the same contract regardless of the hedge's e¤ectiveness.
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Now onto the formal model. We consider a two state model where, in state 1, the correlation between the performance measureṽ and the PHỹ is zero, and in state 2 this correlation is nonzero (and is the same as in the base model). All aspects of the joint distribution ofṽ andỹ other than the correlation are assumed to be independent of state: in particular, the means E[ỹ] = 0 and E[ṽja] = wa ofỹ andṽ are the same in both states, as are the variances 2 y and 2 v , etc.
4 3 It was common in the agency literature of the 1980s to posit that, when a CEO had private information not possessed by his …rm, the …rm could and would extinguish this information asymmetry by o¤ering the CEO a menu of contracts, one for each possible realization of the CEO's private information, resulting in the CEO revealing his private information to the …rm through his selection from among the menu of contracts. (Christensen [1981] , among others, is representative of this approach.)
There are many potential di¢ culties with this "menu of contracts" approach. First, in view of the breadth of the CEO's possible private information, it is di¢ cult to imagine that all information asymmetry between the …rm and its CEO could be eliminated in real life by the "menu of contracts" approach. Second and related, there may be signi…cant hurdles in getting the CEO to articulate fully his private information to the …rm (for reasons related either to Williamson's [2002] "information impactedness" observations or for reasons related to Demski and Sappington's [1987] "delegated expertise" arguments). Finally, there may be several other reasons including complexity related costs, the practical di¢ culties of drafting the menu of contracts, and the lack of robustness of these "communication based" contracts (the design of such contracts can be quite sensitive to the details of the contracting environment) that inhibit their use in practice.
For all of the preceding reasons, and also for analytical simplicity, we do not proceed with the "menu of contracts" approach in this section.
State i occurs with probability p i 2 (0; 1): When the …rm allows the CEO to directly transact with the IB and state i occurs, we denote the CEO's certainty equivalent after receiving the contract s p (v) = c p + b p v and optimally transacting with the IB by CE i (b p jc p ; q; l): When state 2 occurs (i = 2), this certainty equivalent is the same as what we previously referred to as CE(b p jc p ; q; l) in (19) with the reservation price q res (b p jl) being the same as it appears in (16). When state 1 occurs (i = 1), the certainty equivalent CE 1 (b p jc p ; q; l) corresponds to CE(b p jc p ; q; l) as de…ned in (19) above provided the correlation that appears in (19) is replaced by 0; the reservation price for the PH in state 1 is zero:
When the …rm allows the CEO to transact with the IB, the sequence of events in this extended model runs as follows. First, the …rm o¤ers the CEO the contract c p + b p v. The CEO's certainty equivalent under this contract must meet or exceed the CEO's IR constraint in each state. The CEO then observes the state determining the PH's e¤ectiveness and decides whether to work for the …rm.
Then the CEO transacts with the IB. Thereafter, the CEO makes his e¤ort choice. Finally, all random variables assume their realized values; the CEO is paid by the …rm according to the terms of the contract; and the CEO settles any transactions he engaged in with the IB. This sequence of events is summarized in the time-line below. 
subject to for each b p and i and state i, a i = a i (b p ; i ) as in (4) 
and for both state i = 1 and i = 2,
The meanings of these constraints are the same as the meanings of the corresponding constraints in refers to the value of the …rm in this multi-state case; and as above, the subscript A indicates that the …rm is allowing the CEO to transact with the IB.
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Theorem 5 The solution to Program 3 has the following features:
(a) if q < q res (l), then:
(ai) the optimal contract's PFPS is given by:
(aii)^ 2 (qjb p ; l) is given by^ (qjb p ; l) in (17) 
When q < q res (l), the solution to Program 3 depends on all of: how probable the two states are, the prices l and q of the hedges, and the e¤ectiveness of the PH, as measured by the correlation
(note that appears implicitly in both F B and ): The state-speci…c e¤ectiveness of the PH a¤ects the CEO's interactions with the IB, as the CEO buys the PH from the IB only in state 2 when the CEO knows the PH is e¤ective. More subtly, since the PH and the swap are known to be substitutes (recall Corollaries 1 and 2 above), the CEO's preferred RRI in the original contract also varies by state, with the CEO purchasing more of the swap when he knows that the PH is not e¤ective, even though the e¤ectiveness of the swap is not state-speci…c.
Whenres (l), the solution to Program 3 is the same as the solution to Program 1 in the previous section where the e¤ectiveness of the PH was commonly known to both the …rm and the CEO and the price of the hedge isres (l): This follows because, whenres (l), then regardless of whether the PH is e¤ective, the PH is so expensive that the CEO never purchases any of it. Thus, ‡uctuations across states in the e¤ectiveness of the PH are irrelevant, and that case devolves into the "one state" case previously studied. 
subject to:
In stating the program this way, we have implicitly assumed that the …rm never opts to obtain swaps from the IB. This assumption is without loss of generality, as the …xed-for-variable swaps are of no value to the …rm (recall the discussion in Section 6). Another implicit feature of writing the program in this way is that the …rm selects the same quantity of hedge in both states. This is necessarily a feature of having the …rm contracting directly with the IB, since the …rm itself does not see the state. 47 Because of this, and also because the CEO is prohibited from transacting with the IB in the present case, the CEO retains the same RRI in the original contract in both states, and hence takes the same action in both states, as we report in constraint (34). However, since the CEO's expected utility varies by state, we must present two IR constraints, one for each state, as in (35). Written out, the IR constraints for states 1 and 2 are respectively given by:
y ) 0; and (36)
The constraint (36) (resp., (37)) re ‡ects the absence (resp., presence) of a nonzero correlation between the PHỹ and the performance measureṽ in state 1 (resp., state 2).
The key to solving Program 4 is to conjecture that the IR constraint for state 2 will not bind, based on the intuition that any contract designed so that the CEO is willing to work for the …rm when no e¤ective hedge is available (in state 1) should also make the CEO willing to work for the …rm when an e¤ective hedge is available (in state 2). We formally solve Program 4 in the accompanying footnote, and we state the principal implications of the solution to Program 4 as the following lemma. Or have the state communicated to it by the CEO in view of it being presumed that the …rm does not o¤er the CEO "communication based contracts." 4 8 To prove this lemma, …rst consider the program derived from Program 4 with the IR constraint for state 2, inequality (37), dropped. We …rst claim that for whatever bp > 0 the …rm chooses, the optimal choice for for this less constrained 
and …rm value is given by
The lemma reports that the …rm optimally makes no use of the PH as part of the optimal solution to Program 4, and that this is true regardless of the probability p 2 that state 2 occurs, regardless of the e¤ectiveness of the hedge as measured by the correlation in state 2, and regardless of the price q of the PH. The core economic reason for this is that the PH does not help the …rm in reducing the cost of hiring the CEO when state 1 occurs, and -as intimated in the discussion above -only the IR constraint when the hedge is ine¤ective, i.e., in state 1, is binding at the optimum. While the manager would bene…t personally from a positive amount of hedging when state 2 occurs, none of that bene…t can get conferred to the …rm here in the form of a lower base salary c p because lowering the base salary would result in a violation of the manager's IR constraint in state 1 (where the hedge is ine¤ective). This result is driven by the maintained assumption that a single linear contract must version of Program 4 is = 0 : to verify this, take any positive choice for ; and note that in order to satisfy the (only) remaining IR constraint, (36), the base salary cp can be reduced -as compared to the size of the base salary needed to satisfy this constraint were set at > 0. Also notice that since the unconditional expected value ofỹ is zero, the expected value of the objective function is a¤ected by changing only to the extent that the base salary cp has to be adjusted to meet the IR constraint. Further, since bp is being held …xed in this discussion, changing has no e¤ect on the incentive constraint (34). Thus, reducing to zero leads to an increase in the value of the …rm's objective function. This proves the …rst claim. Next, we claim that the objective function of Program 4 when is set equal to zero collapses to E[ṽ cp bpṽja p ] (here, it does not matter whether the expectation E[ ] is conditional on state 1 or state 2, sinceỹ does not appear in the expectation). This follows because when = 0 :
; that is, both expectations E 1 [ṽ sp(ṽ;ỹ)ja p ]; E 2 [ṽ sp(ṽ;ỹ)ja p ] are the same and independent of the state, so these two expectations can be combined together; from this observation it also follows that the two probabilities p 1 and p 2 disappear from the objective function.
Finally, notice that the relaxed version of Program 4 with constraint (36) deleted and the variable set equal to zero is the standard linear contracting problem max a p , 0; sp=cp+bpṽ+dp ỹ E[ṽ cp bpṽja p ] subject to a p = bpwk and cp + :5(bpw) 2 k :5rb
As is usual, to solve this last program, observe that for any candidate optimal PFPS bp > 0, the base salary cp optimally will be adjusted so that the IR constraint binds. Identifying the optimal (bp contingent) cp in this way and substituting it into the objective function yields: bpw 2 k (1 bp) + :5(bpw) 2 k :5rb 2 p 2 v . Maximizing this last expression yields the …rst-order condition for the optimal bp:
which implies bp = w 2 k w 2 k+r 2 v . Substituting this value of bp, and the associated (bp contingent) cp into the IR constraint (37) reveals that this IR constraint is satis…ed, so we were justi…ed in dropping that constraint. Finally, we note that when these choices of bp and cp are substituted back into the objective function, we discover that the …rm's value is given by :5 (w
satisfy the IR constraints in both states, which prevents the …rm from sharing in the social bene…ts of hedging even if state 2 (where hedging is e¤ective) occurs with very high probability.
We now get to the main results of this section by comparing the optimal …rm values reported in the last lemma with Theorem 5. This comparison allows us to determine the desirability of allowing the CEO to transact directly with the IB versus prohibiting the CEO from transacting with the IB when the CEO has better information about the e¤ectiveness of the PH than his employer.
Theorem 6 (i) If the haircut l on the swap is su¢ ciently small and the price q of the PH is any price q < q res (l); then
(ii) if the haircut on the swap l is positive (and in the interval (7)) and the price q of the PH is any priceres (l) ; then
This theorem addresses the classic question of when is it desirable to "co-locate" decision rights with information related to the decision (see, e.g., Jensen and Meckling [1992] ). In this section, the CEO is better informed about the e¤ectiveness of the PH than is the …rm, and so to take advantage of that better information, it would seem that the CEO should be granted control of making the hedging decision. Since that control only has consequences if the CEO is permitted to transact with the IB, it would further seem to follow that the …rm always would be better o¤ letting the CEO transact with the IB. Part (ii) of the theorem shows that this conjecture is not always correct: notwithstanding the CEO's superior information about hedging, it can be bene…cial not to give the CEO control of the hedging decision and transact directly with the IB. Speci…cally, when the PH is priced above the CEO's reservation price q res (l), it is not desirable to let the CEO transact with the IB for any positive level of the haircut on the swap because letting the CEO transact with the IB in this circumstance results in the agency bearing a deadweight loss (due to the haircut) with no o¤setting bene…t (because the CEO never buys any units of the PH from the IB in either state).
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But, when the price of the PH is low enough so that the CEO would purchase a positive quantity of the PH through the IB when the PH is e¤ective (if the …rm allowed him to transact with the IB), then as part (i) reports, the value of the …rm is positively a¤ected by allowing the CEO to transact with the IB (relative to prohibiting the CEO from transacting with the IB). In this case, the CEO's superior information about the hedge's e¤ectiveness can be exploited to the …rm's bene…t, as long as the deadweight loss due to the haircut on the swap is low enough. Further, this expected bene…t for the …rm exceeds the expected rents earned by the CEO in state 2; regardless of the values of p 1 and
This theorem yields a price-based explanation for why some …rms allow their managers to transact with IBs at the same time other …rms prohibit their managers from engaging in such transactions, even when all IBs charge all parties the same prices for all hedging services. To see this, note that each …rm's CEO's reservation price q res (l) varies with each of following …rm-and-CEO speci…c parameters: the unhedged variance of the …rm's performance measure ( 2 v ), the e¤ectiveness of the PH ( ), the marginal productivity of the CEO's e¤ort (w), the CEO's risk aversion (r), and the disutility of CEO's e¤ort (k): Thus, the …rm-and-CEO speci…c reservation price q res (l) can be above the (common) price q IBs charge for the PH at the same time this …rm-and-CEO speci…c reservation price is below the price q for other …rm/CEO pairs. Hence, for su¢ ciently small haircuts l, depending on the values of these parameter values for individual …rms and CEOs, either the …rst part or the second part of Theorem 6 may apply. 
Conclusions
Recently, there has been substantial concern about CEOs hedging their compensation risk by engaging in transactions with investment banks. This article addresses some of these concerns by developing a principal-agent model of the contracting process in which we evaluate some of the economic e¤ects of allowing CEOs to engage in these transactions. Our analysis emphasizes how, by transacting with investment banks, the CEOs transform the compensation contracts their …rms give them into e¤ectively di¤erent contracts. We show that some …rms can bene…t from allowing their CEOs to engage in these contract transformations at the same time other …rms are made worse o¤. Central to our results are the combined e¤ects of: …rst, the ability of the investment banks to synthesize performance hedges that reduce the compensation risk CEOs are subject to without compromising the pay-for-performance sensitivities of the …rms'original contracts, thereby improving the principalagent contracting process; second, the ability of investment banks to o¤er …xed-for-variable swaps which hedging device reduces the PFPS of the CEOs' original contracts and thereby reduce …rms' control over their CEOs'compensation, and hence worsen the principal-agent contracting relationship;
and third, the prices investment banks charge for hedging services, with increases in the price of performance hedges generally leading to decreases in …rm value, and increases in the price of swaps often leading to increases in …rm value. Our analysis suggests that di¤erent forms of hedging have di¤erent e¤ects on managers'contract transformation choices and also their …rms'market values.
Another general …nding of our analysis is that by allowing CEOs to engage in compensation hedging, the PFPS of the contracts the …rms give their CEOs need not be the same as 
Appendix: Selected Proofs
Proof of Theorems 2 and 3
The start of this proof derives the CEO's demand for the PH in the general case (applicable to Theorem 3) where the IB o¤ers for sale both PH and swaps to the CEO. Then, we specialize to the case where the IB only sells the PH (applicable to Theorem 2).
We begin by showing that, if we take as given, then among all^ 0, the CEO's optimal value for^ =^ (qjb p ; ) = (b p ) is given by:
To see this, note that when > 0 is optimal, the …rst-order condition associated with maximizing (15) with respect to is given by:
(Observe that the second-order condition r(b p ) 2 2 y < 0 is satis…ed as long as the CEO retains some of the bonus.) So, the optimal value for is given by: Then by maximizing (41) we obtain the …rst-order condition for :
(1 l)w 2 k(b p 2 ) + F B q (b p )(w 2 k r 2 v (1 2 )) = 0; or equivalently,
(1 l)w 2 kb p + F B q b p (w 2 k r 2 v (1 2 )) = f2(1 l)w 2 k (w 2 k r 2 v (1 2 ))g :
Solving this last equation for shows that (ljb p ; q); which we temporarily write as + (b p jq; l) (the \+ 00 indicating that we are dealing with the case where > 0) is given by:
which in turn implies that the CEO's RRI in the original contract is given by:
[All of the current paragraph is devoted to the special case of Theorem 2, i.e., where the IB is presumed to sell only has the PH to the CEO and the CEO optimally buys a positive amount of the PH, the CEO's CE is obtained from (41) It follows that the …rst-order condition b p when q < q res (b p ) is given by:
Hence, the optimal PFPS b p is given by
Plugging this expression for b p into the …rm's objective function, we get: For allres , the CEO buys no PH from the IB, in which case the CEO's certainty equivalent is given by c p + :5b Returning to the general case of Theorem 3. Let Q + fq 0j the CEO's demand for the PH at price q per unit is positive}. Our next goal is to establish that Q + = [0; q res (b p jl)), where q res (b p jl) de…ned as in (14), uniquely solves the equation^ (q res (b p jl)jb p ; ) = 0:
We know from (39) that, if q 2 Q + , the CEO's demand^ for the PH is given by^ =^ (qjb p ; ) = Thus, in view of (43) and (44) 
To complete the proof, all that has to be done is verify that, with q res (b p jl) de…ned as in (14), for all q < q res (b p jl), demand for the PH is positive, whereas for allres (b p jl) demand for the PH is zero. 
Maximizing this last expression with respect to leads to the optimal ( 0 (b p jq; l)) in the case where = 0: We now write as 0 (b p jq; l) (the "0" indicating that we are dealing with the case where 
The proof of (16) now follows directly from (17), along with the derivations of + (b p jq; l) in (43) and 0 (b p jq; l) in (48) above.
Proof of Theorem 4
In the text, at (21), we showed that, given the contract s 
If q is su¢ ciently small so that the optimal value for is positive, 51 then the CEO's preferred choice of is given by + (b p jq; l) in ( (as given in (20)). Thus, the …rm's expected pro…ts, (50), in this case are given by:
(1 2l)w 2 k + r 2 v (1 2 ) ) + 1 2
Maximizing (51) with respect to b p results in the same …rst-order condition as does maximizing:
The …rst-order condition for the latter objective function is:
which yields the result that
De…ne the function b ; which we have just shown to be the …rm's optimal choice of the PFPS when the price q of the PH is su¢ ciently small that CEO's demand for the PH is positive. Recall the function^ (qjb p ; l) from (17), which de…nes the CEO's demand for the PH, given the prices q and l and given the PFPS b p : Construct the composite function f + (q; l) ^ (qjb + p (q; l); l): Then, f + (q; l) is the CEO's demand for the PH, given the (low) price q and given l and given that the …rm (optimally) o¤ers the CEO a contract with PFPS b + p (q; l): Since the CEO's demand for the PH is always nonnegative, we can de…ne the CEO's demand for the PH given any q 0; given any l satisfying (7), and given the PFPS b + p (q; l) by the function: maxff + (q; l); 0g: We next claim that the price q res (l) de…ned by:
is the unique positive price such that f + (q; l) ? 0 as q 7 q res (l); 
= 0:
The uniqueness of q res (l) is apparent, for example, from line (55) of the preceding, which establishes that the composite function f + (q res (l); l) is a decreasing function of q res (l), and so there cannot be more than one value of q res (l) that satis…es f + (q res (l); l) = 0: That q res (l) is positive is obvious.
A similar analysis applies in the case where q is so large that the optimal value for is zero. We omit the details. This proves part (a) of the proposition.
Part (b) is immediate from the discussion in the text. To prove part (c), in case q < q res (l), just substitute (52) into (51) to get:
(1 2l)w 2 k + r 2 v (1 2 ) ) + q 
where the last equation follows from some algebraic manipulation.
Whenres (l); similar calculations show that the maximum expected pro…ts of the …rm are given by: 1 2 (w 2 k) 2 (1 l)
(1 + l)((1 2l)w 2 k + r 2 v ) :
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